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Abstract
In this article I consider images from a philosophical point of view starting from 
its definition and its relation to thinking. Some analogies with imagetic signs and 
words are established. And in doing this, I try to value seeing, not to the expense 
of saying or thinking, but as a way of getting in touch with images that privilege a 
certain way of knowing.
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1. Introduction
When considering images, the first problem is to identify the theory of images 
that best define them. That is something often difficult to establish because such 
theories lead us to articulate discourse and image. In addition, in an attempt 
to explain them, the discourse overlaps the images. However, do they need an 
explanation?
One of the issues at hand when tackling the possibility of discourse on images is 
their relationship with thought and with seeing or looking. For an image presents 
us with something to be seen and looked at, about which we formulate a thought. 
Barthes ([1], p. 32) wonders if an image is not a simple agglutination of symbols or 
if it produces a system of signs. If we consider that the language-based thought sys-
tem operates differently from image reading, we will come to think of that question 
as not valid. However, for linguistics language is just spoken or written language 
because it is articulated, whereas images seem to form a rudimentary system that 
resists meaning. If there is meaning in the image, how is it added into it? Marie-Jose 
Mondzain states (in [2], p. 23) that thought, in paintings, is within images. We learn 
from images, though it is necessary to distinguish between seeing and looking. For 
visibility cannot be reduced to what is merely apparent, since it is also related to 
invisibility.
Didi-Huberman [3] explores this theme in Devant l’image. Questions posées aux 
fins d’une histoire de l’art. When presenting the issue that prompted him to write this 
book, the author refers to the experiences of whoever lays eyes on a work of art: the 
experience is that of a paradox because, despite unclear and indistinct, what we see is 
simultaneously evident. Nevertheless, those unsatisfied with this paradoxical experi-
ence need an explanation. Such an explanation comes in the form of a speech – that 
is the historian’s or art critic’s discourse, the one who sets himself up as the knower 
of art. However, what prompts us to rise to this level of certainty regarding this 
object that gives us this paradoxal experience? Elkins ([2], p. 41) concedes to feeling 
the attraction to what we call the ontology of the image – meaning the idea that the 
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image has something non-linguistic that is beyond logic and language. It is possible 
to identify in this statement some of the problems we face when seeking to define 
the image and, thus, find a field to understand it: we end up placing the discussion in 
binary distinctions that come from language, such as rational and irrational, logical 
and illogical. Whenever we want to understand them through concepts from other 
areas, we lose sight of them. Every time we establish codes or references, we realize 
that they cannot fully account for the image. Barthes ([4], pp. 68–69) realizes that 
the photographic image cannot be reduced to the object portrayed or to the image of 
the person reproduced. The concept of “punctum”, which can be approximated to the 
Benjaminian idea of aura, refers to something beyond the image. Elkins recognizes 
that some of the positions taken in this discussion are pragmatic, “like Goodman’s”, 
or even his ones. He also argues that non-Western concepts could have a more 
central place in the discussion about image1. Initially I will present Georges Didi-
Hubermann’s and Roland Barthes’s positions on this debate.
2.  Didi-Huberman, Rosalind Krauss: minimal art and European 
avant-garde
According to Didi-Huberman’s [5] critique, minimalism launches an attack 
against seeing. Didi-Huberman discusses the requirements and purpose of minimal-
ism. They aimed, according to Robert Morris and Donald Judd [5], at eliminating 
the illusion to impose specific objects, objects that only asked to be seen. For Didi-
Huberman, this purpose seems simple in theory, but it proves to be more complex 
in practice, since the tendency of illusion is to project itself onto any object. Belief 
easily comes about regarding anything. This statement brings an important element 
to the act of seeing an image: our eyes are not neutral. They do not see colors and 
spatial and materials shapes only, but they add meaning to what is seen. Robert 
Morris and Donald Judd make the following requirements: (1) to manufacture a 
visual object stripped of all spatial illusionism – an artifact that does not lie about 
its volume (Didi-Huberman, [5], p. 50); (2) eliminate every detail to impose objects 
understood as individual, indecomposable totalities ([5], p. 54); and (3) the purpose 
of these first two requirements was to eliminate all temporality of objects in order 
to impose them as objects to be seen always immediately, always exactly as they are. 
When thinking about these requirements and purposes, it seems to us that what 
these artists proposed amounts to a new aestheticism. Pure objects should be seen 
in themselves, even without external references and meaningless attribution. In this 
case, art would refer only to itself, to its own history. For Didi-Huberman, minimalist 
art sought to overcome the representational image, thus presenting objects devoid 
of meaning to those who see these images. In the 1950s and 1960s, minimalism 
emerged as an offshoot of the European avant-garde movements in the United States, 
mainly of expressionism. This movement, unlike what Minimal Art proposed, 
brought images that expressed feelings. Emptying the meaning of image is a pro-
posal that is constituted at that later moment. Frank Stella states in an interview [6] 
that everything he did originated from Kazimir Malevitch’s Black Square [1878–1935] 
with a blue triangle. Here, I would have to differentiate Malevitch’s proposal from 
Stella’s, which I will do in the near future, as this is not our intention at this time. For 
1 At a seminar held in 1998, participants read a revised version of his text Different horizons for the 
concept of the image , in which the author explores Persian, Chinese and Indian concepts of image. I am 
currently investigating this theme and it will be the subject of a future publication. Approaching the 
image from Eastern concepts can broaden our vision, but more than that, it requires an immersion in a 
culture that needs a deeper interest than a mere reference or comparisons with our usual concepts.
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Malevitch the Square [7] is a subconscious form. It is the creation of intuitive reason, 
which he considers necessary to be placed alongside utilitarian reasoning.
Malevitch does not explain the meaning of the expression “intuitive reason”, but 
it can be assumed from some of his statements that it knows things as they are, thus 
opposing utilitarian reason, which “invents the world” and “fake effectiveness” ([8], 
p. 124). For Martineau, the proposal of a new pictorial and philosophical ontology by 
suprematism means an identity between being and nothingness, as well as a libera-
tion of the latter. This would result in man as pure freedom. Rosalind Krauss ([9],  
pp. 303–306]) discusses these relationships and the heritage of the European 
avant-garde movement in the United States. If artists of European expressionism 
and futurism used sculptural form to create a metaphor for organic life, artists like 
Donald Judd will reject the idea of  a deep meaning of their sculptures.
The sculptures by Naum Gabo [10] [1890–1977] and Antoine Pevsner [11] 
[1886–1962], made of plastic, plywood or tinplate, says Krauss, “do not revolve 
around” ([9], p. 303) these materials. However, they visually present “the creative 
power of thought, a meditation on the growth and development of the Idea” 
(idem). Behind the material surfaces, there was an indication of “the interior and it 
was from this interior that the life of the sculpture emanated” ([9], p. 303).
However, according to Krauss, minimalist sculptors, whether in choosing the 
material used or in composing the form, “had the objective of denying the interior-
ity of the sculpted form – or at least rejecting the interior of the forms as the source 
of its meaning” ([9], p. 303). What the minimalists intended was the “reduction of 
art to the point of emptiness”. In this way, they denied the relationship between the 
work and the artist’s interior. Still according to Krauss, by rejecting this relationship, 
Judd was “rejecting a notion of individual self that assumes personality, emotion 
and meaning as elements existing in each of us separately” ([9], pp. 308–9). The 
minimalists, here represented by Donald Judd, are thus questioning the very illusion 
produced by art, and thus art itself. Moreover, they present a posture that is in line 
both with this questioning of art as an activity that puts us in contact with other 
spheres of experience and as a form of communication. Saying “what you are is what 
you see” means to find it impossible to say anything beyond the obvious. Everything 
that one can say or communicate, one says and communicates within the public 
space. Dislodging the unintelligible from art is to consider seeing an operation with-
out depth, and the spectator as an almost inert body deprived of the illusion game: 
seeing happens so quickly that the observer does not spend much observation time. 
Apparently, the observer will not ask what is hidden behind such clean images. We 
can identify in the images of minimalist art the reference to the seriality of industrial 
production. Nevertheless, for those who look at them, the question remains: what am 
I seeing? Do minimalist artists intend to provoke the public, or they simply accom-
modate themselves to the reduction of the image as reproduction? The vision of 
these images is disconcerting: both because they present, as heirs of the avant-garde 
arts, an artistic production that subverts the production procedures of the work – 
they even subvert the avant-garde proposals – and because they present to the viewer 
an image that seems to say nothing to him or her. However, for Didi-Huberman [5], 
there is a contradiction in the minimalist proposal itself. The minimalism to which 
they intend to reduce their works provokes and disturbs, thus posing a current ques-
tion about the image and its visibility.
If Robert Morris was dissatisfied with the way iconographic and iconological 
discourse invested in sculpture, betraying its specific parameters, and Judd was 
opposed to the optical illusion that intends to suggest a third dimension, the answer 
for both would be to manufacture a visual object stripped of illusionism, a spatial 
object in three dimensions that produced its own spatiality. Non-relational objects 
are closed in on themselves ([5], pp. 50–53).
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For Morris, such objects should be “simple volumes” and “their parts… so uni-
fied that they offer a maximum resistance to all separate perception” ([6], p. 54).
As for Judd, he considered that “a strong work should not be composed” ([5], 
p. 54). The result of eliminating composition was to “propose excessively simple 
objects, generally symmetrical, reduced to a minimal form… Objects reduced to the 
simple visibility of their visible configuration, offered without mystery, between 
line and plane, surface and volume.” ([5], p. 54). Frank Stella joined Morris and 
Judd – Frank Stella, whose painting produced in that period had in it “only what can 
be seen in it” ([5], p. 55). Didi-Huberman concludes: the result of this is the vic-
tory of tautology. The artist speaks of the obvious. His art is exactly what you see. 
Moreover, that is what it will always be.
What these artists aimed to produce were stable objects: their stability resides in 
the absence of the marks of time. For that, they used industrial, resistant and mass-
produced materials, as opposed to classic materials. Yet, as we have seen, they aimed 
to produce objects theoretically without meaning games. For them, there is no 
interiority, no latency, no time, no being, just the specific object. No recoil, mystery 
or aura. For Judd, the purpose of this problem is to eliminate all anthropomorphism 
in order to rediscover and impose this obsessive, imperative specificity of the object 
that the minimalist artist took as his manifesto. For these artists, seeing would be 
thus condemned to the smooth and equal surface of their objects, without back-
ground or depth. In addition, it would not refer to anything beyond that surface. A 
pessimistic position that somehow condemned each and every mention, whether to 
the private nature of experience, whether to the sphere of the unrepresented, to a 
product of illusion and imagination, or to a utopia.
However, for Didi-Huberman, there seems to be an internal contradiction in 
minimalism: by presenting themselves as simple objects, do they not engender any 
discourse about them, or is the paucity of words due to the discourse’s inability to 
account for the visual world? For Didi-Huberman, the second alternative is the case, 
since discourses do not always account for what is seen and the attempt to bring 
them together is not always a good solution for the critic. For him, the critic’s work is 
precisely to point out the disjunction between work and discourse, “because it is in it 
that the work’s beauty is found” ([5], p. 69). The disjunction is the place of an open-
ing, of a breach that a discourse about the work problematizes it. For him, the act 
of seeing is not the act of a machine perceiving the real as composed of tautological 
evidence. The act of making visible is not the act of giving visible evidence to pairs of 
eyes that unilaterally seize the “visual gift” to unilaterally satisfy themselves with it. 
Giving to see is always to disturb the seeing, in its act, in its subject ([5], p. 77).
The work of the critic, the one that penetrates the gap, in between, is to find the 
word to what is disturbing, to find the word to what is disturbing in minimalism: its 
insistence on saying nothing.
3. Benjamin’s reflections on paintings and child perception
We can say that Walter Benjamin inspired some of Didi-Huberman’s reflections 
on images. In the quoted work [5], Ce que nous voyons, ce qui nous regarde, the French 
author wrote at least two chapters in which the reference is the work of the German 
critic. There, he mentions both the notion of “aura” and of “dialectical images and 
thought-images”. Here, I will refer to texts from Benjamin’s early period in which 
he presents his reflections on images as well as his experiences in front of some 
paintings.
According to Sigrid Weigel ([12], p. 206), “painting, art history and the discus-
sion of modernist art play a fundamental role in his way of thinking”. Nonetheless, 
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his thoughts on these themes have attracted little attention from scholars. 
According to Weigel, Benjamin’s reflections on paintings and memories of the ones 
he saw, serve as “incubators” for concepts such as thought images, dialectical images 
and non-sensible similarities. I cannot demonstrate this path here, but I shall shed 
some light on some of those reflections that expand the notions of image and 
seeing. I have selected some passages from volume VI of the Gesammelte Schriften 
[13] by Walter Benjamin. This volume brings together autobiographical writings 
and fragments, as well as some sketches grouped under the title Zur Ästhetik (On 
Esthetics), which deal with fantasy and color, in addition to comments on painting, 
child perception and children’s books. Based on this material, I intend to highlight 
the relationships between child perception, color, and fantasy, which recognizes the 
extension of the ability to seeing and a perception “not colonized” by culture.
According to Schiavoni ([14], pp. 12–13), childhood is configured in 
Benjamin’s life
como una especie de tierra de desembarco (categoría al mismo tiempo histórica y 
mítica) recuperada luego de su toma de distancia ideológica del potencial fascistizante 
ínsito en los “movimientos de la juventud” (las Jugendbewegungen) que operaban a 
principios de siglo, y del idealismo de impronta liberal activo en el círculo reformista 
de Gustav Wyneken, el innovador “maestro” de su adolescencia y fundador de la “libre 
comunidad escolar” de Wickerdorf en Turingia, con el que Benjamin rompió drástica-
mente en el verano de 1915 por las elecciones filomilitares patrocinadas por Wyneken.2
Benjamin’s comments and reflections on 19th century children’s books represent 
the pursuit of a childhood capable of fantasizing and perceiving the world for itself, 
without the influence of education tailored to them, which ends up making them doc-
ile and compliant to the rules of the system. A work aimed at children and praised by 
Benjamin in Alte Kinderbücher ([13], III, pp. 14–22; [15], pp. 47–53) provides colored 
prints, fairy tales, and songs that escape the “control of philanthropic theories”. They 
are cultural assets inherited from previous centuries, not sacrificed in the 19th century, 
and which still maintain the relationship with aspects that may resemble the primitive 
due to the used technique. This and other books tailored to children, when not treated 
by the moralizing philistine culture, come to them “as…a sacred text”, a place in which 
“there is a promise of happiness that adults have lost or betrayed” ([14], p. 28).
Benjamin underlines the role of fantasy in texts on child perception and in 
ancient books. Fantasizing is a primordial phenomenon, contrary to creative imagi-
nation. This feature of fantasy can best be seen in fairy prints of German children’s 
books. Different from creative imagination, fantasy is based, for example, on the 
reception of colors. “Pure colour is the medium of fantasy, the home of clouds of 
the child who plays; it is not the rigorous canon of the artist who builds” ([13], IV, p. 
613; [15], p. 59). Fantasy appears as an anthropological feature to which the child is 
closest. When putting together a proposal for child education, Benjamin places at the 
core of his proposal the notion of creative imagination that manifests itself in play, in 
children’s play. Benjamin stresses the feature of the reading game; a game proposed 
by the booklet itself that leads children to do their own reading, to learn how to 
2 “as a kind of landing ground (a category both historical and mythical at the same time) recovered 
after its ideological distancing from the fascistic potential found in the “youth movements” (the 
Jugendbewegungen) that operated at the beginning of the century. Also, distancing from the idealism of 
liberal imprint active in the reformist circle of Gustav Wyneken. Wyneken was the innovative “teacher” 
of his adolescence and founder of the “free school community” of Wickerdorf in Thuringia, with whom 
Benjamin drastically broke apart in the summer of 1915 because of the filo-militaries elections sponsored 
by Wyneken.”
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decipher “hieroglyphs” ([13], III, pp. 127–132; [15], pp. 71–75). In Spielzeuge und 
Spielen he affirms the importance of the game as a resource not to harden the habit, 
but to learn it as a game so that it does not become nature. Thus, eating, drinking, 
sleeping, dressing are habits that “come into life as games.” On the other hand, the 
characteristic of the game is “doing it again and again”, and that means creating a 
habit. The child wants to repeat the lived fact, to taste again “triumphs and victories” 
([13], II, p. 131; [15], p. 75); yet, narrating an experience “relieves the heart” of hor-
rors” (idem). Habits are like fossils, testimonies of a “primal situation from which 
the first impulse was born” (idem). Benjamin’s statements are intended to challenge 
the way we learn – he is opposed to the Enlightenment education model character-
ized, in the afterword of Seidmann-Freud’s booklet, as “relentless pursuit of goals, 
widespread dispute to conquer the ‘knowing’ of what the adult (…) demands” ([13], 
III, p. 272; 1984, p. 107). To this model “the doors of true knowledge are closed”.
He thus emphasizes the importance of childhood experience in the development 
of the adult. In Grüne Anfänge, he states that the seriousness ([13], III, p. 314; [15], 
p. 114) of life has nothing to do with life in black and white or better saying it, with 
the absence of fantasy in adult life, but rather with the scope and importance that 
childhood experiences have for the adult. The smaller the adult’s intervention in 
children’s activities, the greater the flow of fantasy.
Fantasy is closely linked to perception. Benjamin considers it as a primordial 
phenomenon, in the anthropological sense. In his own words:
In the vision of colors, the nature of fantasy reveals itself, as a primordial phe-
nomenon in opposition to creative imagination. Man himself corresponds to every 
form, to every trait he perceives, in his capacity to reproduce them. The body itself 
in the dance, the hand in the drawing, reproduces its elements of perception and 
appropriates them.” ([13], III, p. 613; [15], p. 59).
It is an anthropological feature in the sense that it is related to the way in which 
man receives and reverberates colors, for example.
In their games and plays, children turn to thought and fantasy ([13], III, p. 611; 
[15], p. 57). The examples mentioned by Benjamin are of books that the child can 
build; books that they read and in which they surrender and are absorbed by them. 
They are impregnated with the “fairy central German world… their ingenuity is 
based, as well as that of colours, on fantasy” ([13], III, p. 613; [15], p. 59). In them, 
“colours, as if winged, float over things. For its charm does not radiate from the 
coloured object or simply from the colour” ([13], III, p. 613; [15], p. 60). The child’s 
experience with these readings, and the child’s visual experience with the pictures 
in the books, can be compared to the experience of contemplation, which in the 
essay on the work of art Benjamin opposes to distraction. That is the experience 
avoided by the minimalist works mentioned earlier; works created with the inten-
tion of establishing an immediate relationship with the viewer. The reception of 
these works is conceived by their authors as collective and public, in the register of 
distraction. If we follow Benjamin’s statements in the essay on the work of art, it is a 
tactile reception. Contemplation is the form of optical reception, distanced. It pro-
motes the experience of the aura and leads the “receiver to immerse him or herself 
in deep meditation” ([16], p. 40). For Benjamin, this form of reception that is in 
decay in modernity finds conditions for its existence in childhood. The reception of 
color by vision takes place in order to promote a state of immersion in the object.
The human body, says Benjamin, is incapable of producing color, in relation to 
which the body behaves, therefore, in a receptive rather than creative way. In this 
reception, vision is the faculty that operates active and passive correspondences, 
standing out among the other senses, and allows a movement of immersion in 
things through imagination and fantasy. This movement is not just contemplation 
or concentration, but immersion in the object.
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Thus, for Benjamin, children’s esthetic perception emerges not as a form of 
“esthetic education”, but as a form of maintaining what brings the child closer to the 
artist: the pure experience of colors. An experience that refers to an interiority and 
depth that is being lost.
Author details
Sonia Campaner Miguel Ferrari
Department of Sciences of Language and Philosophy, Pontifical Catholic University 
of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
*Address all correspondence to: soniacamp2@live.com
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
8
Mind and Matter - Challenges and Opportunities in Cognitive Semiotics and Aesthetics
[1] Barthes, Roland. (1977) Image, Music, 
Text, essays selected and trans. by 
Stephen Heath, Nova Iorque, Hill 
and Wang.
[2] What is an Image? Edited by Elkins, J/ 
Naef, M., (1992) Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press.
[3] DIDI-HUBERMAN, Georges, (1990 
[2013]) Diante da Imagem. São Paulo: 
Editora 34, 2013.
[4] BARTHES, Roland (1980 [1984]), A 
câmara clara: nota sobre a fotografia. Trad 
Julio Castañon Guimarães. Rio de 
Janeiro: Nova Fronteira.
[5] DIDI-HUBERMAN, Georges (1992 
[1998]), O que vemos, o que nos olha, 





[7] Malevitch, Black square with blue 





quadrado- ... Accessed on 06/14/2021
[8] MARTINEAU, E., (1977), Malévitch 
et la philosophie. Lausanne: Editions 
l’Âge d’Homme.
[9] KRAUSS, Rosalind, (1998 [2007]), 
Caminhos da escultura moderna. São 
Paulo: Martins Fontes.
[10] Naum Gabo, Kinetic Construction 
(Vertical wave), 1919-20, available at 
https://www.wikiart.org/pt/naumgabo, 
accessed on 06/14/2021
[11] Antoine Pevsner, Mockup of a 
monument symbolizing the liberation 
of the spirit, 1952, available at  
https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artists/
antoine -pevsner-1761, accessed 
06/14/2021
[12] WEIGEL, Sigrid, (2008 [2013]) 
Walter Benjamin, Images, the creaturely, 
and the holy. Trans. Chadwick Smith. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
[13] BENJAMIN, Walter. (1980) 
Gesammelte Schriften, Frankfurt Am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, vol. III.
[14] SCHIAVONI, Giulio, (1981 [1989]) 
Frente a um mundo de sueño. Walter 
Benjamin y la enciclopédia magica de la 
infância, in Walter Benjamin, Escritos. La 
literatura infantil, los niños y los jóvenes, 
Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Visión, 
1989. Colección Diagonal dirigida por 
Aníbal V. Giacone. Traducido por Juan J. 
Thomas, pp. 9-33
[15] BENJAMIN, Walter, (1984) 
Reflexões: A criança, o brinquedo, a 
educação. Trad. Marcos Vinícius 
Mazzari. São Paulo: Summus.
[16] DAMIÃO, Carla M., (2014), “As 
cores da fantasia”. Revista Trama 
Interdisciplinar, São Paulo, v. 5, n. 2, 
p. 38-45.
References
